Facts Outweigh Opinions

Main Beam Load Test

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The purpose of the test was to demonstrate that the hull platform was sound and could support the loads it was designed for. The demonstration of this would eliminate any question of the hull platform’s integrity and hence seaworthiness.

John Koon’s report stated that Dragonfly was a “marginally maintained hull platform.” He questioned the integrity of the hull platform when stating “the mast could have been over-active, moving excessively out of column, as a result of the platform/main beam yielding to compression.” States that “the condition of the platform /main beam / compression path-post could have caused the failure as described by Mr. Wigginton.” These outrageous assertions with no foundational evidence explicitly imply that the vessel was unseaworthy. However, to a individual unfamiliar with construction or structural loading of a catamaran and looking for a reason to deny the claim, Mr. Koon’s observations was easily accepted.

John Koon asserted that the beam yielded to compression even though there was zero evidence of any stress cracks along the beam. Bill Trenkle a SAMS surveyor and Larry Montgomery, the Lloyd’s agent and NAMS surveyor, attested to this fact. In fact, Bill Trenkle noted that the cracks John Koon identified were in non-structural areas. Larry Montgomery also revealed that John Koon did not go into the anchor lockers or other appropriate areas to actually inspect the main beam for cracks.

Fortunately we don’t have to rely on opinions when we can test that the structure is in fact sound. We knew we could conclusively prove John Koon’s beam yielding assertion incorrect by testing the deflection. Tightening the rigging places a measurable load on the beam. The deflection (the degree to which a structural element flexes) as a result of the compression is measured. This would demonstrate whether the deflections met the specifications of the vessel designer, Kurt Hughes

However, without a mast, it was difficult and quite expensive to accurately simulate the load on the beam. However, once we installed a temporary mast used to return to California, it was now possible to conduct a repeatable and industry standard load test.

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We loaded the beam with over 22000 lbs. by tightening the wires that hold the mast in place and determined that the deflection was less than 1/16” (0.066”), which was the deflection that Kurt Hughes had specified in his 1/29/17 report (Kurt Hughes – Beam Strength.pdf).

This conclusively proves that the integrity of the beam today is exactly the same as it was when launched in 1998 and could not be a cause of the dismasting.

John Koon, the damage surveyor for ProSight made several misleading and false statements in his report. These statements were proven false in other portions of our complaint. This test provides one more piece of evidence that puts into serious question the credibility of any opinions presented in John Koon’s report. The shear number of proven false assertions or assertions with no real supporting evidence, should completely discredit the report or anything offered by John Koon.

The remaining information of this document explain the specific details of the load test and pictorially demonstrate the process and results. The load test is a repeatable industry standard test. If requested we will conduct this test in the presence of a ProSight or Lloyds representative.

Concepts behind the testing

Mr. Wigginton graduated as a mechanical engineer from Imperial College London. Mr. Wigginton worked as an engineer in equipment design for heavy equipment and processing. This experience provided him the basis to analyze the structural forces at play on an ocean going vessel.

Kurt Hughes reviewed and validated the load testing technique. Kurt is the designer of many sailing vessels and masts including Dragonfly.

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Dragonfly’s rigging is called a “tripod”. It consists of two shrouds, (port and starboard) and a “headstay”. This picture shows the starboard shroud (the line from the mast to just above the 6) and the headstay (the line from the mast forward).

Our headstay is a roller furler with the headsail on it. It attaches to the cross beam on the front of the boat. The shrouds attach to the oversized chain plates. These three wires put a downward load on the beam thru the mast to hold it in place on the mast step.

This also shows where the mast is located on the boat.

This schema from Kurt Hughes shows that the mast sits directly on the main beam. We have drawn a line between the A and R to represent where the main beam is. The main beam goes from one side to the other and is approximately 5” thick.

Macintosh HD:Users:jill 1:Desktop:Blog Pictures:9 - port turnbuckle after load.jpg The shrouds and headstay are held in place and tightened by turnbuckles (left).

Turnbuckle inner workingsA turnbuckle consists of two threaded eyebolts, one screwed into each end of a small metal frame, one with a left-hand thread and the other with a right-hand thread. The picture to the right shows the inner workings.

The tension can be adjusted by rotating the frame, which causes both eye bolts to be screwed in or out simultaneously

To determine the amount of load put on the beam by tightening the shrouds the “The Folding Rule Method” is used.  Per the specifications, a 2-meter portion of stainless steel 316L wire will stretch 1mm for each 5% of its strength. This is true regardless of the wire diameter. Therefore, it is possible to determine the load based on the stretch of the wire with a 2-meter pole attached to the wire.

Per the specifications the strength of the 9/16″ 316L stainless shroud wire is 37,000 lbs. The goal is to put over 20,000 lbs. of load on the mast to see the deflection of the beam. We will need to stretch the wire 4mm to achieve the load we desire. The reason for that load will be clearer later in the results.

Location of the mast surround in the salon We also need to be able to measure the deflection in the beam. The mast surround sits directly on the beam behind the mast and is available to us inside the salon. We can use a horizontal laser level beam to measure the deflection as we change the loads on it by tightening the shrouds.

In a nutshell we will use 2-meter PVC poles attached to the shrouds, tighten the wires with the turnbuckle, measure the stretch in the wire with a caliper to demonstrate the load. We will then utilize engineering and geometric equations to determine the approximate loads. Using a laser level beam recorded before and after the load is applied will identify the deflection.

The test process

  • Loosen the starboard and port shrouds at the turnbuckles to reduce the current load.
  • Horizontal lines are drawn 1/16th –inch apart on a piece of paper.
  • Tape the paper on the mast surround at the beam.
  • Focus the laser beam directly across from the paper.
  • Align the laser beam with the bottom line on the paper.
  • Clamp a 2-meter piece of PVC pole to both shrouds (316L stainless wire) so the bottom is at the top of the turnbuckle fitting.
  • Turn the turnbuckles to tighten the shrouds.
  • As the wire stretches the two-meter PVC pole moves up as the stainless stretches. The movement is measurable based on the distance between the bottom of the PVC pole and the top of the turnbuckle.
  • Continue to turn until there is a 4mm change by using a digital caliper (a very precise measuring tool) is used.
  • Record the change in the laser beam.

Calculating the Load

Using the folding rule test, the shrouds can be tensioned to 20% of yield strength by extending 4mm on the 2-meter length. Therefore 4mm is equivalent to 7400lbs of tension for each shroud

To calculate the total load on the main beam by the mast, the two shrouds and the headstay loads need to calculated and added together.

The downward force on the mast is calculated as follows.

Shroud Loads

Force vector mathmaticsLength of ST = 68.5
Length of SHF = 18
Length of SPF = 11
Length of SFx = 65

ST = (37,000 *.20) = 7,400
SFx = 7,400 * (65/68.5) * 2 (shrouds)
Sfx = 14044

SHF = 14044 * (18/68.5) = 3689
SPF = 3689 * (11/18)
SPF = 2254 lbs.

Equilibrium

There are three wires (2 shrouds and headstay) pulling the mast to hold it in place. The forces of these three wires must be balanced. Therefore, the pulling forces from the mast to the shrouds and the mast to the headstay have to be equal.

Headstay load

We don’t know what the tension of the headstay is, but we can calculate it because we have the pulling force of the shrouds. So we can use simple geometric equations to determine the tension and thus the vertical force of the headstay.

HPF = SPF = 2254
Length HT = 70
Length HFx = 65
Length HPF = 18

HT = 2254 / (18/70)
HT = 8767

HFx = 8767 * (65/70)
HFx = 8140

Total Load on Beam by Mast

The total load would be to total of the force of the shrouds (Sfx) plus headstay force (Hfx)

14043 + 8140 = 22,183 lbs.

Conducting the Test

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Starboard                    Port

Attached a 2-meter PVC pole to the starboard and port shroud wires.

Al shows that the pole is 2 meters with the tape measure. Al is 6’3.

Note that he is measuring from the clamp that holds the PVC pole to the shroud wire.

Below is the measurement at the turnbuckle fitting

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Starboard                     Port

The PVC pole sits at the top of the turnbuckle fitting before the turnbuckles have been tightened.

Starboard                     Port

The starboard and port turnbuckles before they are tightened.

Note the number of threads visible.

Macintosh HD:Users:jill 1:Desktop:Blog Pictures:11 - Sheet on Mast Surround before load (2).jpg The paper is taped to the mast surround so the laser beam is at the main beam.

This is the laser beam prior to the tightening of the turnbuckles.

The laser beam is parallel to the top of the main beam

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Note that the bottom of the laser beam is on the bottom line.

Macintosh HD:Users:jill 1:Desktop:Blog Pictures:8 - starboard turnbuckle after load.jpg Macintosh HD:Users:jill 1:Desktop:Blog Pictures:9 - port turnbuckle after load.jpg The turnbuckles are tightened.

Note the change in the threads visible from the earlier pictures.

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Starboard                      Port

The digital caliper is used to show the distance between the bottom of the PVC pole and the top of the fitting on both sides

Starboard shows 4.10mm

Port shows 4.11mm

Per the load calculations this causes each wire to put an approximate of 7400 lbs. on main beam via the mast.

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The laser beam after the tightening.

Note the bottom line has moved down below the laser beam less than 1/16”. This is consistent with Kurt Hughe’s original design specifications.

Conclusion

This load test utilized industry standard techniques and standard engineering equations to demonstrate thru pictures that John Koon’s assertion that the beam yielding to compression was ludicrous. Kurt Hughes, the vessel designer, states that under full main sail the load on the beam would be on the order of 25,000 lbs. and yield 1/16”.

This demonstrates that the deflection is consistent with Kurt Hugh’s design and would yield only a small fraction of an inch. In fact Kurt Hughe’s designed the main beam to handle 21 times the anticipated full load. Therefore, even a higher load would be only a fraction more. This amount of main beam yield compression could not possibly lead to the mast buckling as suggested by John Koon. This proves his assertion false and should put in question ALL other baseless assertions by him.

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Complaint Response from ProSight

On May 24, 2017 we received an acknowledgement of our complaint from Satvinder K Ajimal (Satty) a Conduct & Compliance Manager for ProSight Specialty Managing Agency – Syndicate 1110. Satty apologized that we felt the need to file a complaint. She assured us that it would be dealt with promptly and we would receiving a response soon.

Follow-up regarding response

July 14 was eight weeks from the date we submitted our complaint to ProSight and our understanding of their deadline. We did not want to irritate them by following up sooner than we should expect a response. On July 11, we sent a follow-up email to Satty to see if they would have a response to us by the deadline. We received the following from Satty on July 12th.

“ProSight provided a response to your complaint on 6th June 2017., which was sent by post addressed to Mr A Wigginton c/o Crew’s Mess Limited.  I have attached a copy of the complaint response, as it would appear that this was not passed on to you by Crew’s Mess.”

WHO THE HECK IS CREW”S MESS?

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Why didn’t Satty send us an email as promised!

 

Rubber Stamped Response

The letter stated the “on the basis of the reports provided by the surveyors, yacht was deemed unseaworthy at the time of the initial incident in May 2016 and that this would have equally been the case on 1 April 2016, when your insurance policy incepted. Hill Dickinson further advised that the unseaworthiness of the vessel at the inception represented a breach of warranty and the contract of insurance was consequently and properly treated void ad initio (and that the premium paid would be returned to you). Accordingly both claims have been rejected for the reason that there is no insurance policy in force against which a claim may be made.

Having reviewd this matter, I note that no new evidence or other information has been provided to counter the position set out by our lawyers. Accordingly, I do not consider there to be any grounds to change our position and can confirm that this represents our final decision on this matter.

Should you wish to pursue the matter further, you may refer the matter to the Indiana Deparment of Insurance. 

Paul Longville, Head of Compliance, ProSight Managing Specialty Managing Agency Ltd

Our complaint was clearly not reviewed

WHAT!!?? We spent thousands of dollars more and taken two months to compile and reply to every allegation, innuendo and false statement that Hill Dickenson had in their claim denial. How can the letter say there is “no new evidence or other information“? However, Satty had stated that they would review it promptly, not thoroughly or fairly.

We also thought that sending it to Crew’s Mess was a clear indicator of their lack of concern. They sent it to a company we had never heard of. Satty told us that she would respond to us.

Why are they referring us to the Indiana Department of Insurance? This is policy was written by a UK-based insurance company

Response to their response

angry typing.jpgWe responded on July 14th lambasting them for sending a letter to a company we don’t even know. It also outlined all the new evidence provided:

  • Documentation demonstrating that the rigging age was within the USCG standards
  • Statement from the location that Dragonfly was hauled and mast unstepped annually
  • Statements by the British Stainless Steel regarding the lack of fatigue on unstressed stainless as the rigging would have been due to the annual hauling.
  • Report and photographic evidence by Bill Trenkle addressing the seaworthiness of Dragonfly
  • Report from an international rigger regarding the condition of the remaining rigging
  • Financial records of the significant annual maintenance records
  • Photographic proof of John Koon’s false statement regarding the stripping of the gennaker turnbuckle
  • The statements made by Larry Montgomery (their agent) refuting John Koon’s report.
  • Email logs with the USCG
  • Passage logs for the trip as requested.

July 21, 2016 we received an acknowledgement from Satty of our July 14th email stating that she would “review your comments and respond as soon as possible.”

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More Unethical Actions by Agent

Two-Faced Unethical Actions - Larry MontgomeryJanuary 23rd we received an email from Larry providing an overview of his visit. He listed the things that he looked at, but did not include the condition of what he saw. More unethical actions from Larry Montgomery. He repeatedly stated that the items he saw were in contradiction to the John Koon report. We responded:

“We are disappointed that you did not convey that the items shown to you were in the original John Koon survey. Also that they were reported differently in the report than what you repeatedly acknowledged the actual condition to be. We expect that if there are questions about these by Mr Scott or the underwriters, you as a qualified NAMS surveyor, are prepared to convey that the issues Mr Koon reported did not have evidence of the problems he identified.”

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Addressed the unethical actions offline

After receiving no response from him regarding his lack of transparency with LJJ Associates and ProSight regarding the items he witnessed on Dragonfly, we sent him a direct email on Feb 2, 2017 The email suggested that he had an ethical responsibility as a NAMS surveyor to communicate what he saw.

He responded and said that he was providing the pictures and a copy of our email to Mr Spink and Wayne Scott. We do not know if an email was ever sent to them. Larry had always cc’d us on emails like this. However it didn’t happen this time. Therefore we are very suspicious that it was not done. If it was, we suspect that it didn’t represent what he told us. If it contained the truth, why not share it?

No justified vindication

We clearly expected Larry to be honest, join the experts and confirm that the John Koon report had a significant number of false statements in it. He apparently did not do this so his inexcusable unethical actions continue to be a roadblock.

Daniel, our solicitor submitted our response on Feb 2, 2017. So now we wait. Hoping that someone will see reason.

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Olive Branch – Seeking Shared Truth

Olive Branch - Seeking Shared TruthWe contacted Larry on Jan 14, 2017 and invited him to come on board to review the findings of Bill Trenkle with us and take the theft and damage claims. We were extending an olive branch to work together to determine what was the truth.

On Jan 16, Wayne Scott authorized him to come on board and told him to  “investigate and report to underwriters on all matters listed please.”

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Inspection of Areas and Items in Dispute

Larry came on board on Jan 17. He inspected, verbally confirmed and took pictures of the following and other areas:

  • Main beam – No stress cracks in the anchor lockers or in the berths where attached to the main beam. He admitted they did not get into the anchor locker during the June survey since there were lines and fenders in the lockers.
  • Forward beam – No movement of the forward beam brackets evident on the outside or inside. Larry acknowledged that the forward beam design allowed it to twist on the bracket when under load from the anchor.
  • Minor mast surround leak – was due to the salon roof flexing, not the main beam flexing.
  • Minor water leaks around the front windows was due to the curved designed of the surface, resulting in it being difficult to get a good seal. It had nothing to do with the beam flexing.
  • The remaining turnbuckles, were not stripped, in good condition and functional.

Larry wrote up the claims for the damage and theft which Al signed and told us that he would send all of this information to Wayne Scott.

Vindication!

We felt vindicated. Larry openly admitted that John Koon’s report, which he was involved with, was incorrect. He agreed one-by-one that each of major flaws portrayed in the report did NOT exist.

We thought this mess would soon be over. Finally, the truth would be shared.

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A Legitimate Survey

Bill Trenkle conducts a legitimate surveyBill Trenkle,  is a Accredited Marine Surveyor, with the Society of Accredited Marine Surveyors (SAMS); a Certified Marine Investigator (CMI), with the International Association of Marine Investigators (IAMI); and holds a Bachelor of Engineering degree in marine engineering, As a Marine Surveyor, a Marine Engineer and active offshore and America’s Cup sailing crew and project manager, Bill has personally been involved in the design, construction and maintenance of dozens of masts from 1976 to the present. Bill has raced in and won the Americas’ Cup in 1987 and 1988 and competed in 6 other America’s Cup campaigns and two Around the World Race campaigns, in management and technical roles, as well as sailing crew roles.

We felt confident that a legitimate report from an individual with his qualifications would convince ProSight, LJJ and Hill Dickinson that John Koon report was incorrect in his assertions and suppositions.

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Survey

Bill arrived to survey Dragonfly on January 11, 2017. Bill spent the day going over Dragonfly, testing and taking numerous pictures. He stated multiple times that Dragonfly showed no evidence of structural or rigging deficiencies which would have caused the dismasting.  Bill expressed his shock at the inaccuracies and baseless suppositions in the John Koon Report

Some of Bill’s statements in the survey are::

  • Mr. Koon’s conclusion that the mast step may have been deflecting “Yielding-failure of main beam in way of mast-compression path” causing the vessel to be compromised, causing the mast to fail was quickly observed by the undersigned be a completely unsupported statement.
  • There is no structural movement of the entire main crossbeam including where the mast step transfers load to the aft vertical shear web of the main crossbeam.
  • The vessel main crossbeam has a safety factor of 21:1. In other words, it is 21 times stronger than it needs to be to prevent failure, this is quite evident when you inspect the vessel. The size of the mast bulkhead, which is the aft shear web of the main crossbeam, is massive. The statement that this beam was deflecting and causing the mast step to deflect downward is not supported in any way from an engineering, boatbuilding, mast design, rigging or any other perspective.
  • Mr. Koon mistakenly interprets cracks in the mast surround and seating area as being related to structural movement of the main beam and mast step. These are only lightweight closeout structures that take no structural load, they are inherently flexible and tend to crack at the joints. This is what Mr. Koon saw and misinterpreted as structural movement.
  • In Mr Koon’s report he reports that the vessel was “in marginal condition in terms of general maintenance”. The majority of his observations are either cosmetic or are directly related to the loss. He has not taken to get into consideration the fact that the vessel had to motor 400 miles after already completing a significant journey. He does not take into account the damage to the vessel from the incident and mitigation efforts made by the vessel owners to get the vessel safely back to harbor, or the fact that clean up on the vessel has been halted until resolution of the claim so that no disruption of evidence can be claimed.
  • Mr. Koon questions the age of the rigging however the oldest rigging were the diamond stays which replaced in 2008. Seven and half years prior to the loss. The industry stand is 5-10 years. It should be noted that this vessel was laid up for 1⁄2 the year in Florida until 2013 and when used was not pushed hard and the actual miles are minimal.
  • Mr Koon’s comment that the operators had a lack of concern or understanding is not supported by anything in his report and in the opinion of the undersigned is a misrepresentation of the owner’s knowledge and concern regarding the rigging. Mr Wigginton is a University trained and highly experienced mechanical engineer who appears to the undersigned to have a better understanding of the engineering of the mast and structure of this vessel than Mr. Koon based on the comments in his report.
  • Rigging components, which had not been jettisoned at the time of this dismasting, were observed to be in good condition. Rigging age was well within industry replacement cycle standards based on the usage history of the vessel.

Dismasting

Over his career, Bill has personally experienced 13 dismastings, because his career has been in the racing industry. Based on his legitimate experience he agreed that only reason for the mast to have failed as it did was a rogue wave on the opposing side to the wind hitting the vessel. He states:

  • Disregarding all of Mr Koon’s unfounded remarks it is important to note that if the mast suffered a lower diamond failure the mast would have broken at the lower spreaders. If the upper diamond broke the mast would have broken at the upper spreaders. There is no evidence indicating that a rigging failure was the mode of failure.
  • Any dismasting caused by a rigging failure would have been completely different in nature; therefore a rigging failure can be completely dismissed as a cause of the loss.
  • It is the professional conclusion of the undersigned that the cause of loss is that the vessel suffered a large wave impact at the port bow. The momentum of the mast and force on the sails, when the boat was essentially stopped by the wave at full speed, overloaded the mast section at the lower tangs causing it to buckle and fail. This is not an unusual failure mode.

Well said!

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Go Nuclear to Prove our Justifiable Claim

Shooting missile.pngWe felt that we needed to get serious and pull together credible sources and information, which would force them to see that we had a justifiable claim. We needed to do the following as quickly as possible, realizing that during the holiday time would probably slow things down.

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To demonstrate a justifiable claim we needed to:

  • Clearly understand the different companies involved and their roles
  • Find an attorney or UK solicitor. Our policy states “in the UK and under English Law”. But needed to determine if someone was experienced in the US with cases like these. Qualifications needed to be:
    • English law
    • Marine knowledge
    • Lloyd’s of London experience
  • Find our own surveyor who would out shine John Koon and Larry Montgomery in knowledge.
  • Locate an individual who could confirm the reality of rogue waves against the opposing wind.
  • Provide proof that would demonstrate the strength of the beam and it’s inability to flex
  • Gather maintenance history
  • Acquire statements from the crew
  • Find a way show to a lay person, the forces on the mast for each of the theories thereby proving the rogue wave scenario and disproving John Koon’s theories.

Over the next two months we:

  • Got a loose understanding of a convoluted Lloyd’s insurance system. We bought a policy from a broker (Blue Water), who acquired a policy from LJJ Associates, who are brokers in the UK, who got ProSight 1011, a Lloyd’s of London syndicate, to underwriter the policy. ProSight’s underwriters were making the decisions.
  • Hired a UK Solicitor Daniel Crockford. He specialized in marine cases and had sailing experience, so understood the situation.
  • Bill Trenkle a NAMS surveyor and international marine investigator. He also worked for Dennis Connor on the America’s cup and had in-depth knowledge of catamarans. We scheduled him to come onboard Dragonfly Jan 11 to survey her and address the supposed structural problems.
  • Contracted with Mike Lenneman, an oceanographer, catamaran and mast builder to explain the rogue waves and his personal experience with a similar dismasting.
  • Met with Jay Butler an America’s cup rigger to inspect the remaining rigging and attest to its good and functional condition.
  • Requested Kurt Hughes, the designer of Dragonfly and the mast to address the beam flexing, mast compression and tri-pod rig.
  • Compiled annual expense reports demonstrating the more than adequate maintenance done annual.
  • Acquired statements via questionnaires from each of the crew
  • Proved that the age of the rigging fell within all guidelines specified including ones that John Koon was involved in developing for the Coast Guard.
  • Acquired the Coast Guard logs and explained how a Mayday is not appropriate unless life is at risk.
  • Compiled the trip log to the extent that we could from our navigation software.
  • Made drawings showing the forces of the different scenarios.
  • Responded to the accusations and theories made by the solicitor from Hill Dickinson

The data we developed, accumulated and organized filled a 3″ binder. Daniel Crockford, our UK solicitor it reviewed and submitted it to Hill Dickinson.

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WTF! – Survey with Significant Errors and Baseless Suppositions!

report with lies.jpgAugust 12 ,2016 we received a copy of John Koon’s “damage” survey, dated July 11, 2016. Larry Montgomery clearly misled us on the intent of the report. But worse than that, the report was filled with significant errors, untruths and baseless suppositions. Some of the erroneous items were:

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  • Margionally maintained hull platform, machinery, electrical systems, de-watering equipment and pollution control prevention.”  A loose broad statement with no evidence provided in the report. Was Dragonfly a mess? Yes, but you would expect her to be based on the dismasting and issues dealt with after.
  • Indicates that the vessel may have been compromised from failure of main beam in way of mast-compression path.”  Mast compression is an issue on monohulls NOT catamarans with tri-pod rigs.
  • Vessel may have been fitted with a mast-section not well suited for vessel’s beam, inherent stability, righting moment, displacement and reported sail area” The mast was designed by a marine engineer who designed the boat. Dragonfly had been sailed over 100,000 miles for 18 years with no issues in much worse conditions. This statement made no sense.
  • He states that the remaining rigging was stored with other “failed rigging equipment“. We do not store failed rigging equipment, we store partially used rigging equipment as emergency spares like all long distance cruisers do. It’s like when you get a new frying pan, don’t you keep the old one just in case?
  • He identified “fractured weld seams and weeping fasteners”  the weld was for aesthetic purposes and not load related. The surface of the deck bolts had some rust, but there was no evidence of them weeping inside the vessel, nor did he offer any.
  • He stated “Both beam brackets show indications of racking. Possibly due to the hulls articulating vertically and independently of each other” This is absurd. How could the boat navigated the distances it had if this was true. There was also no evidence of this thru stress fractures or where the brackets connected to the beam.
  • He stated that the “genaker turn buckle had stripped“. There was no evidence of this, in fact it was completely functional and still attached when they arrived in Honokohau Harbor.

False Handshake - Shady CharacterShocked & Confused

We were shocked! He made statement after statement that could be misleading to a unknowledgeable reader with no basis for questioning them. Would they have a marine savvy person reviewing the claim? Larry had also been in attendance during the “survey”. He had never given us any impression that there might be an issue. Every time we talked with him or exchanged emails, he was very encouraging. Was Larry being open and honest with us?

We realized that this would have a significant impact on our claim and we probably had a fight on our hands. But surely a knowledgeable person looking at the report with our counter arguments would realize the inaccuracies. We just needed to make our response clear. But in the back of our minds was the question… was this done on purpose, to give them a reason to deny our claim?

list of significant errors

During Al’s flight he outlined all the false statements, significant errors and unsupportable suppositions in an email to Larry and told him that we would provide a more detailed response after he returned to Indianapolis.

 

 Gotta Move Dragonfly from Honokohau

 

No Availability at marinasBut we had a more time critical issue to address. Time was up and we had to move Dragonfly. Al flew to Hawaii on August 14 to find another location for her. We had called all the marinas and they told us they had no space.  Ken Fairchild offered to go with Al and help him find a place to dock her. He had spent a lot of time in Hawaii and advised that you had a better chance of finding a place if you just showed up.

Dfly at Ala Wai harborAfter stopping at multiple locations Al and Ken were able to find temporary dock space in Ala Wai Harbor in Honoloulu. Since it was temporary, a person had to go to the office every 14 days and pay for the dock for the next 14 days. Al found John Dukesherer who would do this for us. Fortunately he was familiar with the process and people involved. He was also familiar with boats and could assist us with any long distance maintenance required.

Al returned to Indianapolis August 24.

Our complete detailed response was submitted on August 31.

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Submitting the Dismasting Claim

Blue Water Insurance - lousy customer serviceDragonfly arrived in Honokohau Harbor on Friday May 6, 2016. We called Blue Water Insurance to submit our dismasting claim on Monday morning. The response we received was curt, insensitive and un-informative. We were told that we would be hearing from a local agent and the conversation was ended.

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Dock for Dragonfly

In the mean time we needed to find a place for Dragonfly to stay. The temporary dock space we were provided would last no more than 90 days.

Big Island HawaiiJill had called several marina’s prior to the 6th. All of them were less than enthusiastic about accommodating a vessel 65′ x 32′. We drove the entire circumference of Big island and had little or no luck finding a marina that could accommodate us.

We called individuals in the islands to see if they could provide assistance. One of which was John Koon. He told us that he could come from Oahu to Big Island to survey the boat and write a report that would support us. Because it was certain that the insurance company would try to “screw us”.

Lloyd’s agent first contact

Larry Montgomery, the Lloyd’s agent and local surveyor called us. He explained that he was assigned our dismasting claim and would come to the boat on May 19 to do a “field assessment“. He was very encouraging, stating that “You have paid your premium and the insurance companies expect to have some claims. Our objective is to make you whole again.” Based on that call we saw no reason to pay John Koon to come and do an independent survey. A decision which we regretted later.

Jill returned to Indianapolis on May 10 and the crew left soon after. Al stayed to address what he could. His priorities were the engine problems, water proofing and securing broken parts, and long-term dock space.

”Less”